Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 19
Issue 1 Winter 1986

Article 7

1986

Case Digest
Law Review Staff

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Law Review Staff, Case Digest, 19 Vanderbilt Law Review 231 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol19/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

CASE DIGEST

This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that re-

present current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes
cases that establish legal principles to new and different factual
situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and references are given for further research.
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I. ACT OF STATE
ACT
Do NOT NECESSARILY INSULATE A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT FROM
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES

CIVIL LIABILITY FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF A PERSON ON UNITED
STATES Som - Liu v. Republic of China, slip op. No. 85-7461

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 1986).
Helen Liu sued the Republic of China (ROC) and several former officers of the ROC government alleging their responsibility
for the assassination of her husband, Henry Liu, on October 15,
1984. The ROC government agreed that the named officers participated in the killing. In fact, a criminal tribunal set up by the
ROC convicted the former officers of murder. The criminal tribunal concluded, however, that the ROC had no part in the killing.
While the ROC did not claim that the act of state doctrine applies to assassinations by foreign states, the ROC maintained that
the instant action would require a detailed investigation into the
tribunal's findings. That sort of inquiry, the ROC argued, was
precluded by the act of state doctrine. The district court disagreed and held that neither the act of state doctrine nor the For-
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eign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) bar the court from considering the plaintiff's claims. The court stated three reasons for
rejecting the ROC's act of state argument. First, the defendant
failed to demonstrate that an act of state occurred. The court explained that proceedings in foreign tribunals generally are not
considered acts of state. Instead, the doctrine encompasses government actions which give effect to the government's public interests. Second, the court reasoned that the possibility the litigation may involve embarrassing or intrusive discovery would not
necessarily invoke the act of state doctrine. Third, the court
maintained that the litigation would not necessarily require it to
consider the legitimacy of the ROC's tribunal's findings. The
court reminded the parties that the act of state doctrine may justify a later dismissal of the action, requiring the court to weigh
the integrity of the ROC tribunal's findings. In addition, the district court put aside the contention that the FSIA deprived the
court of jurisdiction. The court found that under the facts alleged, the ROC waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA. Subsection (a)(5) waives immunity of
foreign states for deaths occurring in the United States which
were caused by the tortious acts of foreign officials who were acting within the scope of their nondiscretionary authority. Significance - Even though the court purports to follow precedent, the
court has allowed the plaintiff to advance beyond the preliminary
steps in pursuing a claim which would be nothing more than a
repeat of the ROC tribunal's investigation of official government
involvement. The act of state doctrine purports to bar this sort of
litigation.
II. EXTRADITION
POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO BAR EXTRADITION IF OFFENSES ARE COMMITTED WHERE No UPRISING EXISTS -

Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
The United Kingdom sought the extradition of William Joseph
Quinn, a United States citizen and Irish Republican Army (IRA)
member, for his alleged role in the murder of a policeman and a
bombing conspiracy in England in 1974 and 1975. After a United
States magistrate found him extraditable, Quinn petitioned the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus. Using the incidence test for the
political offense exception, the district court granted Quinn's peti-
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tion. The district court did not reach the statute of limitations
question. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated

and remanded the decision. The panel unanimously vacated the
writ to remand the conspiracy count for consideration of the statute of limitations question. The judges could not agree, however,
on the rationale for vacating the writ pertaining to the murder

charge. As a result, each wrote an opinion. Judge Reinhardt discussed at length the historical development of the political offense exception and criticized the analysis set forth in Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
Judge Reinhardt argued that the Eain court strayed from the
traditional political offense analysis and rationale by considering
whether the particular forms of conduct used were acceptable
means for carrying out a political uprising. He maintained that
the traditional, two-part incidence test was appropriate. The incidence test asks (1) whether the offense occurred during an uprising and (2) whether the offense was committed in connection with
the uprising. According to Judge Reinhardt, the first prong imposes a geographic limit which prevents extradition for only those
acts committed where an uprising exists. Using the facts determined by the magistrate, he found that in 1974 and 1975 an uprising was present in Northern Ireland, but not in England. Since
the alleged offenses occurred in England, Reinhardt concluded
that the political offense exception could not apply to bar Quinn's
extradition. Judge Duniway, on the other hand, used the Eain
test and held that the political offense exception did not apply.
Moreover, he doubted the general usefulness of a geographic limit
because it might preclude genuine political offenses. Judge
Fletcher, concurring and dissenting, stated that the incidence test
was appropriate, but reached a different result. Citing the constitutional ties between Northern Ireland and England, she found
that the uprising extended to England. Judge Fletcher remanded
the matter to determine whether Quinn had sufficient contacts
with Northern Ireland since the issue was not argued below. Significance - These opinions demonstrate the current confusion
surrounding the political offense exception. The result affirms the
importance of the incidence test, proposes a geographic limit
within the incidence test, and suggests that the political offense
exception will not prevent the extradition of international
terrorists.
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III. JUDGMENTS
UNITED STATES COURTS HAVE

No AUTHORITY

TO ENFORCE FOREIGN

JUDGMENTS WHEN THE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE IS
MADE VIA LETTERS ROGATORY FILED DIRECTLY IN THE COURT, In

Re Civil Rogatory Letters Filed By The Consulate of the United
States of Mexico, 640 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
The Mexican consulate in Laredo, Texas filed letters rogatory
with the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas. The letters sought judicial assistance in enforcing a judgment by a Mexican court against a Mexican national who was residing in Laredo, Texas. The court recognized that the procedure
followed by the Mexican consulate was proper under the applicable consular conventions in effect between the United States and
Mexico. But the court stated that the normal procedure for enforcing foreign country judgments via letters rogatory called for
the foreign government to submit the letters to the United States
Department of State rather than to the court directly. The State
Department then would sift through the claims, sending some to
the courts for enforcement and returning the others unexecuted.
The court added that the scope of judicial assistance to foreign
tribunals and litigants before such tribunals was limited by 28
U.S.C. ]] 1782. Section 1782 applies only to obtaining evidence for
use in those tribunals and makes no mention of the enforcement
of foreign judgments. Citing the normal procedure set down by
the state department and the limits on judicial authority in §
1782, the court dismissed the request without prejudice. The
court explained that it lacked the authority to enforce the judgment as presented. Significance - This decision demonstrates
that the directives of the State Department are followed even
ahead of treaty obligations.
IV. JURISDICTION
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT HAD SUBJECT MATTER AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT IN ACTION AGAINST SOVIET UNION
FOR VIOLATION OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY,

Von Dardel v. Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F.Supp. 246 (D.C.D.C. 1985).
Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages
against the Soviet Union for the unlawful seizure, imprisonment,
and possible death of Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat.
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Plaintiffs alleged that in 1945 Wallenberg, was arrested in Budapest by representatives of the Soviet Union. Wallenberg was in
Budapest acting on behalf of the United States in an attempt to
save Jews from Nazis. Plaintiffs maintained that since then he
has suffered imprisonment and possible death. The Soviet
Union's only response to this lawsuit was a diplomatic note which
asserted absolute sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs applied for a default judgment. Before discussing the merits of the case, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia considered three major issues: (a) sovereign immunity; (b) subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act; and (c) the statute of limitations.
The court found that it had subject matter and personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28
U.S.C. § 1602 and took note of four of the plaintiffs' arguments
why the Soviet Union should not enjoy immunity. First, by virtue
of its decision to default, the Soviet Union failed to raise the defense of sovereign immunity. By raising the issue of sovereign immunity only in a diplomatic note, the Soviet Union knowingly
chose a procedure that is no longer available under United States
law. Second, the FSIA could not be read to extend immunity to a
foreign sovereign's clear violation of a universally recognized principle of international law such as diplomatic immunity. Third,
even though the FSIA is limited by treaties to which the United
States is a party, the Soviet Union cannot claim immunity under
the FSIA for acts which constitute violations of conventions to
which the Soviet Union is a party. Fourth, by explicitly agreeing
to be bound by terms of international human rights agreements
and of treaties codifying the fundamental principle of diplomatic
immunity, the Soviet Union, under § 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA, implicitly waived its sovereign immunity.
Next, the court considered whether the Alien Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1350, vested it with subject matter jurisdiction over
this action. The Act granted federal district courts jurisdiction of
any civil tort actions allegedly committed by aliens in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. The court
noted that the plaintiffs were aliens and the causes of action were
brought in tort. The court identified an unquestionable violation
of the law of nations, as defined by legal scholars, confirmed in
international conventions to which the United States is a party,
and codified in United States law. The court explained that alleged violations involved an area of international law in which
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standards and norms had long been well-defined. For these reasons, the court concluded that it enjoyed subject matter jurisdiction of this action. Finally, the court determined that plaintiffs'
claims against the Soviet Union were not barred by any applicable statute of limitations. The court held that the statute of limitations had not yet begun to run because the unlawful detention
of the diplomat was a continuing violation of the laws of the
United States, the law and treaties of the Soviet Union, and the
law of nations.
The court turned to the merits of the case and held that the
Soviet Union's seizure and subsequent detention of Wallenberg
violated the law of nations, as well as a number of international
treaties and conventions relating to human rights, all of which
had been signed by the Soviet Union. The court also held that an
accredited Swedish diplomat was an "internationally protected
person" within the meaning of the Act of Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1116, 1201(a)(4), (e).
Significance - This case constitutes an unprecedented action
against a foreign sovereign because it involves actions which the
Soviet Union has already declared unlawful and actions which
were committed in gross violation of the universally recognized
principle of diplomatic immunity.
V. LABOR
ARBITRATOR'S ORDER REINSTATING WITH BACKPAY Two UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS WAS NOT REVIEWABLE IN FEDERAL COURT BECAUSE

THE AWARD DID NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY AND WAS NOT IN
DISREGARD OF THE LAW - Bevles Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791

F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986).
Relying on a California statute which outlawed employers from
knowingly employing illegal aliens, Bevles Company dismissed
two of its employees, Bareza and Dorme, when they could not

prove they were in the United States legally. The dismissed employees' collective bargaining agent, Teamsters Local 986, sought

reinstatement claiming that the dismissal lacked just cause. An
arbitrator granted reinstatement with backpay to Baraza and
Dorme. The arbitrator found that Bevles lacked just cause because the California law cited by the employer was dormant. The
arbitrator's order was upheld by both the federal district court
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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The Ninth Circuit explained that it would not review the arbitrator's decision unless Bevles could prove that the decision violated
a clearly defined public policy or was in manifest disregard of the
law. The court rejected Bevles' claim that the arbitrator's order
violated public policy because Congress has not passed any law
which imposes liability upon an employer for employing illegal
aliens. The court added that the award was not in manifest disregard of the law because California officials has not actively enforced the law in question. Further, the court supported its decision by pointing out that allowing labor remedies to illegal aliens
would not result in a conflict between the polices behind labor
law and the policies behind immigration law. Significance - The
Bevles court's decision contradicts the Court's analysis in SureTan v. N.L.R.B, 467 U.S. 883 (1984). The Sure-Tan articulated a
policy of reconciling labor law with immigration law. Id. at 903.
The Bevles court, however, did not consider that Baraza and
Dorme were not entitled under immigration law to be present in
the United States at the time the arbitrator ordered their reinstatement with backpay.

